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ABSTRACT 
 
Using a sample of 291 banks from 35 OIC (Organization of Islamic Cooperation) 
member Muslim countries with 2078 bank year observations from 2003 to 2010, we analyze if 
bank earning management in terms of Loan Loss Provisioning (LLP hereafter) is affected by the 
banking nature whether Islamic or conventional, by the bank accounting standards whether rule-
based local Generally accepted accounting principles (here after local GAAP) or principle-based 
International Financial Reporting Standards (hereafter IFRS), and by the bank listing status. We 
argue that Islamic banks may exhibit lower signs of earning management, as the Sharia’h 
Supervisory Boards (SSB hereafter) in Islamic banks may work as an additional tier into the 
governance system. On the use of accounting standard, we argue that banks using IFRS standard 
may exhibit lower evidence of earning management, as IFRS requires managers to disclose more 
accounting information compared to local GAAP. We report mixed evidence supporting these 
arguments. 
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Loan Loss Provisioning in OIC Countries: 
Evidence from Conventional vs. Islamic Banks 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Following the financial frauds of Drexel Burnham Lambert in 1990 and later Enron in 
2001, managerial discretion in earning management comes under increasing scrutiny from both 
regulators and researchers. More recently, the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, 
makes a strong point that poor management in financial institutions may plant the seed of future 
financial crisis. Although early bank earning management literature goes back to Wahlen’s 
(1994) seminal paper, following the collapse of Lehman Brothers during the recent global 
financial crisis, research interest in bank earning management has been rejuvenated in recent 
years. Existing literature suggests that bank managers may resort to earning management for 
three commonly cited reasons: a) income smoothing, b) capital management, and c) signaling 
hypotheses (see: Wahlen, 1994, and Ahmed et al., 1999, for surveys of the literature, and 
Anandarajan et al., 2003, Bouvatier and Lepetit, 2006, and Das and Ghosh, 2007, for recent 
contributions). However, the existing empirical evidence mostly focuses on the United States and 
other selected Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (hereafter OECD) 
countries, which is best summarized as inconclusive. It is therefore interesting to revisit the 
question of bank earning management with a new and a different set of countries. 
In addition to the recent increase in research interest in the bank earning management, the 
comparatively resilient performance of Islamic banks during the 2008 global financial crisis has 
generated much interest among researchers. Addawe (2012) and Ahmad and Pandey (2010) 
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suggest that Islamic banks have generally outperformed the conventional banks. In this paper, we 
argue that, in the presence of Sharia’h Supervisory Board, bank managers in Islamic banks are 
generally less likely to be involved in earning management than their compatriots are in 
conventional banks. Furthermore, we investigate whether bank earning management in terms of 
LLP can be affected by changes in accounting standards, bank listing status and bank 
specialization in terms of conventional vis-à-vis Islamic banks in a sample of total 291 banks 
from 35 OIC member countries. 
This empirical study on bank earning management in terms of LLP in OIC member 
countries is motivated by two reasons. First, and as already pointed above, the existing literature 
mostly focuses on the developed economies. Hence, a cross country analysis focusing on OIC 
member countries comprising developing and emerging economies may provide additional 
understanding about the nature of bank earning management in less developed countries. Second, 
the choice of OIC countries offers a unique opportunity to analyze the difference in bank earning 
management between Islamic and conventional banks, given the identical religious environment. 
As Islamic banks generally operate under a similar prudential regulatory framework as their 
conventional counterparts, the analysis presented below will shed light on the additional 
governance structure in Islamic banks that may have an impact on their bank earning 
management. Ghosh (2013) offers a first analysis of banks’ earning management using data for 
six Gulf Cooperation Council (hereafter GCC) countries. Unlike Ghosh (2013), our study 
comprises a more comprehensive data set covering a large number of Islamic countries and 
banks with a more recent data observations. Furthermore, we analyze how change in accounting 
standards may affect bank earning management in terms of LLP.  
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Core to the motivation of this study, we also analyze if change in accounting standards 
imparts an impact on bank earning management. Because local GAAP and other prevailing 
accounting standards are converging to a more principle-based accounting standard, as in IFRS, 
by the end of 2015, analyzing the impact of different accounting standards may provide different 
insight to the bank earning management literature. Existing accounting literature shows that the 
migration from a rule-based to a principal-based accounting standard, such as IFRS, has 
otherwise reduced managerial discretion in earning managements in non-financial firms during 
the mandatory migration of accounting standards of 2004-2005 for EU countries (Capkun et al. 
2010). We extend this literature by analyzing the impact of accounting standards on earning 
management by analyzing the banking industry compared to non-financial firms, as in current 
literature. To our best knowledge, this study is one of the few studies to explicitly analyze the 
impact of similar migration of accounting standards in the banking industry. A recent study of 
Fonseca and Gonza´lez (2008) finds that earning managements in listed banks are systematically 
different than not-listed banks. However, Fonseca and Gonza´lez (2008) consider six Muslim 
countries only. We complement their study by considering a larger cross-section of Muslim 
countries, by differentiating between conventional and Islamic banks, and by analyzing whether 
banks’ listing status plays a role in bank earning management manifestation. 
Two reasons intertwined with each other commend for a global perspective of analysis on 
bank earning management in terms of LLP. First, moving from one accounting standard to 
another involves significant change in regulatory regimes and for any given country, such events 
are rather infrequent. To analyze the effects of changes, a larger cross section of countries used 
allows us to utilize more information in analyzing the phenomenon empirically. Second, as OIC 
countries are generally developing economies, the number of banks in a single country is rather 
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small; therefore, a cross-country study allows us to bring in more information to form a bigger 
dataset of bank information. Consistent with the core arguments, this study analyzes three 
explicit questions: Whether bank earning managements in terms of LLP are different for Islamic 
banks compared to conventional banks? Whether changes in accounting standards affect 
managerial discretion over managing earnings in the banking sector? Whether banks’ listing 
status of being listed or not-listed, affects managerial discretion on LLP reporting? 
The research questions analyzed in this paper are likely to contribute to the current 
literature on bank earning management in four different ways. First, we differentiate bank 
earning management for two different types of banks, Islamic and conventional banks; plus we 
argue that pertaining difference may be contributed to the additional governance influence 
imparted by the Sharia’h Supervisory Board (SSB) system. Second, this study is one of the 
earliest studies to recognize differences in accounting standards as a factor behind bank 
managerial discretion. Third, we complement other cross country studies on bank earning 
management that generally focus on developed countries like the United States, EU and OECD 
member countries, with samples ending around 2004. Fourth, our dataset covers a time period of 
8 years from 2003 to 2010 which provides us with reasonably large and recent information, 
compared to extant studies that generally use a dataset ending in 2004. 
The remainder of the study is organized as follows: section two provides a brief overview 
of extant literature; section three presents the core research questions and related hypotheses in 
the methodology section; section four provides a brief description of data and plausible 
econometric techniques to analyze the research questions; section five discusses the empirical 
evidence; and finally, section six summarizes the key findings. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1  Loan Loss Provisioning and Bank Earnings Management  
Existing literature on bank earning management generally provides three major 
explanations: a) income smoothing, b) capital management, and c) signaling hypothesis. First, 
the income smoothing hypothesis argues that bank managers tend to set aside LLP during good 
times so that they can use them as a buffer during business cycles downturn to cover higher loan 
delinquencies. Greenawalt and Sinkey (1988), Wahlen (1994) and Beaver and Engel (1996), 
among others, provide supporting evidence that loan loss provisioning has positive relation with 
earnings before tax and provisions. However, Beatty et al. (1995), Ahmed et al. (1999), among 
others, provide contrasting evidence. 
Second, the capital management hypothesis argues that bank managers use loss loan 
provision as a buffer to the bank capital requirement; and when faced with minimum capital 
requirements they tend to use LLP to cover the capital shortfall. Kim and Kross (1998), Ahmed 
et al. (1999), Cortavarria et al. (2000), and Das and Ghosh (2007), among others, document a 
negative relationship between LLP and bank capital supporting the capital management 
argument. Third, the signaling hypothesis argues that managers can use higher loan loss 
provisioning as a proxy for financial strength; and accordingly LLP is positively related to the 
change in earnings. Although, Bouvatier and Lepetit (2006) provide supporting evidence for 
signaling arguments using banking data of France, UK, Germany and Italy; Anandarajan et al. 
(2003) document contradictory evidence for a Spanish sample. 
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A number of studies focuse on multi-country comparisons in managerial discretion in 
Loan Loss reporting. Leuz et al. (2003) analyze the existence of earning management in non-
financial firms in a global setting. Chih and Shen (2005) analyze the earning management 
phenomenon in the banking industry in 48 countries. Using three alternate measures and 
controlling for a number of factors, Chih and Shen (2005) document that earnings management 
is rather a global phenomenon. 
  
2.2  Governance of Islamic Bank vis-à-vis Conventional Bank 
 Existing literature on Islamic banking and finance suggest that, compared to their 
conventional counterparts, Islamic banks are subjected to one additional level of governance 
structure in the form of Sharia’h Supervisory Board (SSB). The governance structure of an 
Islamic bank may include other regular governance tiers, like Board of Directors, Compensation 
Committee, Audit Committee and others, which is similar to conventional banks (Karim, 1990, 
and Ghayad, 2008). 
SSB is generally responsible for assuring investors, shareholders and other stakeholders 
in the Islamic bank concerning the Sharia’h compliance in banking transaction (Warde, 1998). 
SSB is also responsible for providing clarification on any Sharia’h related issued pertaining to 
daily operation, ensuring conformity with Sharia’h laws in economic, initiating new financial 
instruments and implementing Sharia’h compliance. Accordingly, Karim (1990) argues that the 
governance role of SSB may be viewed as similar to the independent company auditors. 
Contrary to this notion, we argue that SSB may have unobservable and/or unintended influence 
on bank managers and may prohibit them to use earning management as a tool for self-interest. 
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2.3 Accounting Standards and Earnings Management 
Changes in accounting standards and the resulting implications for earnings management 
is a well-researched phenomenon in accounting literature. Earlier accounting literature rather 
documents the limited abilities of regulatory changes in discouraging or encouraging earnings 
management (see: Healy and Wahlen, 1999, for a survey). In contrast, some later studies, such as 
Hung and Subramanyam (2004) and Bartov et al. (2004), document that changes in accounting 
standards may indeed add value to accounting information, specially, in the developed economy. 
Following the “Norwalk Agreement” between the Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(hereafter FASB) and the International Accounting Standards Board (hereafter IASB) to create 
more principles-based accounting standards for global financial reporting by the end of 2015, a 
number of recent studies focuse on plausible implication of convergence of accounting standard 
convergence on bank earning management. 
More recently, Beest (2009) analyzes the effects of discretion in accounting standards on 
both the level and nature of earnings management by presenting manipulations of IAS 32 and 
IAS 36 as proxies for the rules based and the principles-based setting. His results show that both 
the rules-based and principles-based treatments lead to comparable levels of earnings 
management. Such findings are consistent with arguments which suggest that changing 
discretion in accounting standards can affect the nature of earnings management. Beest (2009) 
also documents that the probability of earnings management through transaction decisions is 
higher in a rules-based setting than those in a principles-based setting. 
In a contemporary study, Ganguli et al. (2009) analyze whether changes in accounting 
standards add value to accounting information in China. Comparing the characteristics of 
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accounting data of IAS-adopting firms vis-à-vis non-adopting firms, they conclude that adopting 
firms are less likely to smooth earnings in the post-adoption period. Later, Capkun et al. (2010) 
analyze the use of flexibility of IFRS by 1,635 European Union firms which occurred during the 
2004-2005 mandatory transition from local GAAPs to IFRS; their results suggest that firm 
managers using IFRS accounting standard tend to manage earnings less in contrast to local 
GAAP counterparts. 
To summarize, recent evidences in existing accounting literature are supportive of the 
arguments that rule-based accounting standards, in general, allow more managerial discretion in 
managing earnings, compared to principle-based accounting standards for both developed and 
transitional economies. We contribute to this line of accounting literature by providing empirical 
evidence for a set of OIC member countries. 
 
2.4 Bank Listing Status and Earning Management 
Beatty and Harris (1999) is one of the earliest in the literature to analyze the impact of 
listing status of firms on earning management. Later, Beatty et al. (2002) show that when 
publicly traded firms have more outsiders, earnings announcements and financial statements may 
have a greater signaling effect. Moreover, trading cost for uninformed shareholders in publicly 
traded firms and managerial self-interest suggest that managers may have higher incentives to 
manage earnings through income smoothing. However, these studies are based on banking 
datasets of the United States. Recently, Fonseca and Gonza´lez (2008) extend their argument to a 
cross-country dataset of banks; they find that listed status of banks may also have similar 
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implications on earning management behavior. In this paper, we complement Fonseca and 
Gonza´lez (2008) by incorporating six Muslim countries used in their study.  
 
2.5 Bank Earning Management in Muslim Countries 
A recent trend in the bank earning management literature focuses on Muslim countries. 
Misman and Ahmad (2011) investigate LLP for both Islamic and conventional banks in Malaysia 
over the 1993–2009 period. They find that both Islamic banks and conventional banks in 
Malaysia use LLP in earning and capital management. 
More recently, Othman and Mersni (2012) analyze the use of discretionary LLP by 
Islamic and conventional banks in seven Middle East countries including 21 pure Islamic banks, 
18 conventional banks with Islamic windows and 33 conventional banks over 2000 to 2008. 
Their findings are similar to those in Misman and Ahmad (2011) suggesting that that both 
Islamic and conventional bank managers resort to earning and capital management. 
We contribute to this by employing a large dataset of 291 banks from 35 OIC countries 
totaling 2078 observations over the 2003–2010 period. In our analysis, we control for country-
specific macroeconomic variables and country corruption index, in line with previous studies. 
We expect that including more cross-country variations may allow us to get a better 
understanding of the LLP and bank earning management in Muslim countries. 
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3. METHODOLOGY 
3.1  Hypothesis Development 
Existing literature suggests that bank managers may resort to earning management and 
LLP for three reasons: a) income smoothing, b) capital management, and c) signaling. Income 
Smoothing Hypothesis suggests that bank managers tend to set aside higher LLP during the good 
times and accordingly LLP is positively related with EBTP. Signaling Hypothesis suggests that 
managers may use LLP as a signal of higher supervision and hence LLP is positively related with 
change in CHANGEEBTP. Capital Management Hypothesis argues that managers tend to use 
LLP as part of Tire I capital requirement during capital shortfalls and hence negatively related 
with TIREONEREGCAP (see: Wahlen, 1994, Ahmed et al., 1999, Anandarajan et al., 2003, 
Bouvatier and Lepetit, 2006, and Das and Ghosh, 2007). 
Our first hypothesis examines whether these three commonly cited explanations of LLP 
are empirically supported for the OIC member countries. Accordingly, we hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis I:  
 
In general, bank earning management in terms of LLP exists in the banking 
sector of OIC member countries. 
Next, we investigate whether and how the above three LLP motives  are affected by bank 
specialization in terms of being an Islamic or a conventional commercial bank, changes in 
accounting standards, and bank listing status. Earlier literature on Islamic finance and banking 
suggests that, Islamic banks are subjected to one additional level of supervision imparted by the 
Sharia’h Governance board which do not apply to the conventional banks. Since Islamic banks in 
OIC member countries work under the similar prudential regulatory framework as their 
conventional banking counterparts, we argue that the existence of Sharia’h Governance Board 
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may reduce the possibility of bank earning management among Islamic banks. This leads to our 
second hypothesis: 
Hypothesis II:  The nature of bank earnings management in terms of LLP is different for the 
Islamic banks compared to the conventional banks in OIC countries. 
Empirical literature on accounting standard and earnings management documents that 
migration from rule-based to principal-based accounting standards can affect managerial 
discretion in managing earnings in non-financial firms. Between the two types of standards, 
IFRS or the principal based standard allows for more discretion and at the same requires higher 
disclosure. Accordingly, firms using IFRS may exhibit higher earning management compared to 
the local GAAP (Beest, 2009). We extend these findings to banking industry and argue that the 
difference in accounting standards, whether a rule-based or principal-based, may also affect bank 
earning management through LLP. Moreover, we argue that banks using IFRS are more prone to 
bank earning management manifestation. Accordingly, our third hypothesis is: 
 
Hypothesis III: Bank earning management in terms of LLP is more prominent in banks using 
IFRS accounting standards, compared to banks using local GAAP and other 
accounting standards. 
Fonseca and Gonza´lez (2008) document that LLP provisions are significantly different 
for listed banks compared to the non-listed banks. Managers of listed banks have higher 
incentive for earning management because banks are under higher regulatory purview and more 
visible than non-listed banks. We revisit their argument related to the impact of banks listing 
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status on bank earning management among Islamic and conventional banks in OIC countries. 
Accordingly our fourth hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis IV: The nature of bank earnings management in terms of LLP is different for the 
listed banks compared to the not-listed banks in OIC countries. 
 
3.2  Empirical Specification and Variable Definitions 
3.2.1 Country-specific and Bank-specific Control Variables 
Empirical studies analyzing bank earning management with multi-country dataset 
generally control for country-specific variables such as gross domestic product (GDP), per capita 
GDP, growth rate of per capita GDP, and inflation rates to capture country-specific business 
cycles (see Chih and Shen (2005), Djankov et. al. (2007), and Fonseca et al. (2008)). Bank asset 
size and net income are two frequently cited control variables are also used in the bank earning 
management literature. We include both the bank-specific and country-specific control variables 
in our analysis. Besides, throughout our analysis, we include yearly fixed effects to account for 
any systematic differences in LLP across years and country fixed effects to account for potential 
unobserved heterogeneity. Table 1 provides a brief summary of description of the variables and 
their sources.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
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3.2.2 Empirical Specification 
Equation (1) presents the generic specification of the empirical model used most 
frequently in the bank earning literature (Ahmed et al. (1999), Wahlen, J. (1994), and Ghosh 
(2007), among others). Equation (1) holds loan loss provision (LLP) as the dependent variable:  
                                                                      
                                                          
(1) 
where i=1,2,…,N and t=1,2,…T are indices of the cross-section and time series dimension, 
respectively. Bank managers are required to classify delinquent loans in different categories and 
set aside provisions based on the level of default risk before they can classify and write-off a 
loan as bad and loss. So, because of the nature of prudential regulations and the risk matrix, LLP 
is generally auto-correlated and accordingly we use the first lag of LLP as an explanatory 
variable in Equation (1). Operating profit, measured by earning before tax and provision (EBTP), 
is expected to have a positive effect on LLP if the income smoothing explanation holds. Tier-II 
capital requirement (CRAR) captures the capital management motive and is expected to affect 
LLP negatively. The change in earning before tax and provision (EBTP) is expected to be 
positive if bank managers implicitly use LLP as a signal of future earnings. 
We utilize Equation (1) to test the three hypotheses that are pivotal for our analysis. In 
Hypothesis II, we argue that because of the additional supervision imparted by the Sharia’h 
Governance, bank earning management in terms of LLP may be less prominent for the Islamic 
banks compared to the conventional banks. To analyze Hypothesis II, we conduct two separate 
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estimation of the equation (1); one for conventional bank sub-sample and another for Islamic 
bank sub-sample. 
Hypothesis III argues that for different types accounting standards, i.e., rule versus 
principal based accounting standards, managerial discretion in terms of LLP may differ. To 
analyze Hypothesis III, we conduct two separate estimation of the equation (1); one for local 
GAAP bank sub-sample and another for IFRS bank sub-sample. 
Hypothesis IV argues that, for different types of listing status, i.e. banks being listed or 
not-listed, managerial discretion in terms of LLP may vary. To analyze Hypothesis IV, we 
conduct two separate estimation of the equation (1); one for listed bank sub-sample and another 
for non-listed bank sub-sample. 
 
3.3  Econometric Techniques 
Our final sample comprises an unbalanced panel data with 2078 yearly observations for 
291 unique banks from BankScope database for a sample period of eight years from 2003 to 
2010. In our model specification, dependent variable is LLP and the model includes first order 
lag of LLP as one of the explanatory variables. Under these circumstances, the model becomes 
dynamic and the assumptions of strict erogeneity of the repressors of panel estimations no longer 
hold. Besides, the Least Square Dummy Variable (LSDV) estimates may no longer be consistent 
when T is small and N is large as is this dataset. Given these situation, a probable alternative is 
using the Arellano and Bond (1991) two-stage generalized least squared (GLS) approach of 
Dynamic Panel GMM estimation which provides unbiased and consistent estimation. We use the 
Arellano and Bond (1991) approach with White-corrected standard errors. 
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Besides, we use different combinations of country control variables so that the 
estimations of interest variables are robust of selection of control variables. We use separate sub-
sample estimation for different typology of banks; like: IFRS vs Local GAAP banks, 
Conventional vs Islamic banks, and listed vs non-listed banks rather using one single nested 
model to avoid the confusion of interpretation as selecting on single unique base case scenario is 
difficult as data becomes segmented.  
 
4. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
4.1 Sample selection criteria 
Initially, we begin with a 16 years sample from 1996 to 2011 with 1574 unique banks 
from 56 OIC member countries. However, for a bank to be included in our analysis, we require 
banks to report loan loss provisioning, total asset size, their listing status, areas of specialization 
being Islamic or conventional, earnings before tax and provision, Tire-I capital ratio. In addition, 
we collected information on nominal GDP, nominal per capita GDP, and growth in GDP from 
IMF’s World Economic Outlook database. Besides, we also obtained country variables as 
mentioned in an LLSV (1998) study from the LLSV website for the matching countries. Our 
final sample comprises 2078 yearly observations for 291 unique banks from BankScope database 
for a sample period of eight years from 2003 to 2010 covering 35 OIC member countries with 
matching country variables. Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics of the bank sample. 
[Insert Table 02 about here] 
 
4.2 Sample distribution: Bank specialization, accounting practices and listing status 
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Our sample includes 245 conventional commercial banks and 46 Islamic banks 
comprising 1,789 and 289 bank year observations, respectively. Panels A and B in Table 2 
summarize the bank characteristics of Islamic and conventional banks in terms of accounting 
practices and bank listing status. Panel A shows that almost half of the banks in both Islamic and 
conventional banking sample use IFRS accounting standard, while the remaining banks follow 
local GAAP. More concretely, 154 (52.92%) banks use local GAAP, and the remaining 137 
(47.08%) banks use IFRS accounting standard. Distributions of bank years for Islamic and 
conventional banks in terms of accounting practices are also almost equally divided.  
Panel B reports the bank listing status of Islamic and conventional banks. As can be seen, 
165 (56.7%) out of 291 banks are listed, while the remaining 126 banks are not-listed. In terms 
of bank years, the overall contribution of listed bank is 58.08% (1,207 bank years) compared to 
not-listed banks with 41.92% (871 bank years). 
Panel C in Table 2 shows that bank observations are almost evenly distributed across the 
years. However, the 2003 and 2004 period have a relatively lower number of observations 
compared to other years. Panel D summarizes the distribution of Islamic and conventional 
commercial banks across the OIC member countries included in the sample. Out of 35 member 
countries in the sample, 12 countries (Bahrain, Bangladesh, Jordan, Kuwait, Malaysia, Pakistan, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen) have both Islamic 
banks and conventional banks operating simultaneously. Iran is the only country to have only 
Islamic banks and no conventional banks at all. However, our sample includes only one bank in 
Iran that fulfills the data sufficiency requirements. The other 22 OIC member countries included 
in the sample comprise of only conventional banks. 
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4.3 Bank characteristics: Bank specialization, accounting practices and listing status 
Panel A of Table 3 reports the summary statistics of important bank variables in the 
overall sample. Panels B, C and D provide more insights on bank characteristics by presenting 
and comparing descriptive statistics for Islamic versus conventional banks, banks using IFRS 
versus banks using local GAAP, and listed versus not-listed banks. 
[Insert Table 03 about here] 
Panel B of Table 3 shows that both Tier-I and total regulatory capital are significantly 
higher for Islamic banks compared to conventional banks. However, Islamic banks are 
significantly different and smaller in asset size compared to conventional banks. However, the 
standard deviation of asset size of conventional banks is more widely dispersed than Islamic 
banks. Although the LLP ratio is significantly higher for conventional banks, there is no 
significant difference in any of the three profitability ratios: EBTP to asset ratio, ROAA and 
ROAE. 
Panel C shows that LLP ratio, Tier-1 regulatory capital ratio and total regulatory capital 
ratios are significantly lower for not-listed banks compared to listed banks. However, listed 
banks are, on average, larger in asset size and higher in ROAA and ROAE. The results in Panel 
D suggest that banks using IFRS accounting standards generally have larger total asset size, have 
higher LLP, regulatory capital ratios and ROAA, but otherwise have lower ROAE. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
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In Table 5, we report the Pearson correlation coefficients for the overall sample without 
differentiating for banks specialization, listing status or the use of accounting standards. The 
results show that Tier-1 regulatory capital ratio and total regulatory capital ratio are strongly 
correlated. Accordingly, in our empirical specification we include either of the two variables as a 
proxy for capital management. Total asset size exhibits a significantly negative correlation with 
regulatory capital ratios and the LLP ratio; besides, both capital ratios are negatively correlated 
with LLP ratio. 
 
4.4 Country Macro-economic controls and Financial Controls 
Table 4 reports the descriptive statistics of the country control variables for the OIC 
member countries for the period 2003–2010. We use three macro-economic control variables: a) 
GDP per capita, b) GDP growth rate and c) inflation. In addition, we include corruption indexes 
collected from LLSV (1998) as an indicator for governance. 
Panel A of Table 4 summarizes the descriptive statistics for the country variables. Among 
the OIC member countries, there is a large variation in terms of GDP and per capita GDP values. 
The maximum 730.318 billion USD GDP value is represented by Turkey in 2008, while the 
lowest GDP figure stands at 0.985 billion USD for Sierra Leone in 2003. Panel B presents more 
detailed distribution of country GDP figures over the years. The high standard deviation of 
136.078 points to the presence of large variation in the sample. Another interesting point to 
observe from Panel B is the increasing level of dispersion of the GDP figure from 2003 to 2010. 
Such results support to the assertion that poor countries are failing to catch up with the growth 
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potentials of other emerging and developing countries. Results from panel C also support such 
argument. 
For other variables, such as, GDP per capita, per capita GDP growth and inflation rate, 
similar variation is notable. Against a 76,435 USD per capita GDP of Qatar in 2008, the figure is 
merely 208 USD for Sierra Leone in 2003. Such large variations in country control variables 
justify the selection of country specific effects in the regression equations as discussed below. 
 
5. EMPIRIC EVIDENCE 
5.1 Loan Loss Provisioning in OIC member countries 
Table 6 presents the Panel GMM estimation of equation (1) for the overall OIC bank 
sample without differentiating the bank classification and provides empiric evidence for the 
banks in general. Among the three core arguments of earning management: Income Smoothing, 
Signaling Hypothesis and Capital Management hypothesis, we fail to find supporting evidence in 
favor of any of the arguments for the overall OIC bank sample. 
Income Smoothing Hypothesis suggests that bank managers tend to set aside higher LLP 
during the good times and accordingly LLP is positively related with EBTP. For the overall OIC 
bank sample, we fail to find evidence supporting income smoothing hypothesis as coefficient 
estimates of EBTP are not significant in any case. Signaling Hypothesis suggests that managers 
may use LLP as a signal of higher supervision and hence LLP is positively related with change 
in CHANGEEBTP. However, results in Table 6 suggest rather negative but significant 
coefficient estimates for CHANGEEBTP. Capital Management Hypothesis argues that managers 
tend to use LLP as part of Tire I capital requirement during capital shortfalls and hence 
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negatively related with TIREONEREGCAP. Although the coefficient of estimates of 
TIREONEREGCAP are negative as expected but they are statistically insignificant; so we fail to 
conclude. 
 [Insert Table 6 about here] 
5.2 Bank specialization and LLP: Islamic Banks versus Conventional Banks  
Table 07 reports the Arellano and Bond (1991) Panel GMM estimation of equation (1) 
for the two sub-samples of the overall OIC bank sample: a) a sub-sample comprising 
conventional banks only, and b) a sub-sample comprising only Islamic banks. 
Among the three core arguments of earning management: Income Smoothing, Signaling 
Hypothesis and Capital Management hypothesis, we find supporting evidence in favor of Income 
smoothing for both conventional banks and Islamic banks as the coefficient estimates for EBTP 
is generally significant at 5% for most of the specifications for both the conventional and Islamic 
banks. Besides, we find supporting evidence of signaling argument for the Islamic banks as the 
CHANGEEBTP coefficients are positively related with LLP and statistically significant at 5%. 
However, for the conventional banks, there is no significant evidence supporting the signaling 
argument. For both, conventional and Islamic banks, we find so significant evidence supporting 
Capital management argument as the coefficient estimates for TIREONEREGCAP are negative and 
insignificant for conventional banks and positive and significant for the Islamic banks. 
 [Insert Table 7 about here] 
5.3 Accounting Standards and Loan Loss Provisioning 
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Table 08 reports the Arellano and Bond (1991) Panel GMM estimation of equation (1) 
for the two sub-samples of the overall OIC bank sample: a) a sub-sample comprising Local 
GAAP banks only, and b) another sub-sample comprising IFRS banks only. 
Among the three core arguments of earning management: Income Smoothing, Signaling 
Hypothesis and Capital Management hypothesis, we find strong supporting evidence in favor of 
Income smoothing and capital management explanations for banks using IFRS accounting 
standards as EBTP coefficients are positive and significant and TIREONEREGCAP coefficients are 
negative and significant for the majority of the specifications.   
However, for the local GAAP practicing banks, there are weak evidence in favor of 
income smoothing and capital management arguments as EBTP coefficients are positive and 
significant and TIREONEREGCAP coefficients are negative and significant for the majority of the 
specifications. For both local GAAP and IFRS using bank samples, we find no significant 
evidence in favor of signaling explanation that argues LLP to be positively related with Change 
in EBTP.  
To summarize, our finds are consistent with the findings by Beest (2009) for non-
financial firms in the EU dataset. Results are supportive of the argument that IFRS accounting 
standard being a more principle-based system requires higher accounting disclosure and allows 
more managerial discretion.  
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
5.4 Bank Listing Status and Loan Loss Provisioning 
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Table 09 reports the Arellano and Bond (1991) Panel GMM estimation of equation (1) 
for the two sub-samples of the overall OIC bank sample: a) a sub-sample comprising listed banks 
only, and b) another sub-sample comprising non-listed banks only. 
Among the three core arguments of earning management: Income Smoothing, Signaling 
Hypothesis and Capital Management hypothesis, we find strong supporting evidence in favor of 
Income smoothing for both the listed and non-listed banks as EBTP coefficients are positive and 
significant. For the other two explanations, we find no significant evidence as change in EBTP is 
other negative and significant contrary to the signaling argument and TIREONEREGCAP 
coefficients are negative but significant for both types of banks. 
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
Panel regression estimates for the overall sample provides few insights in terms of the 
bank managers in OIC member countries, in general. However, once the banks in the OIC 
sample are classified into conventional-vs-Islamic banks, local GAAP-vs-IFRS banks and listed-
vs-non-listed banks categories, such classifications provide more insight about managerial 
motives in earning management in the sample banks. 
Among the three core arguments of earning management: Income Smoothing, Signaling 
Hypothesis and Capital Management hypothesis, we find supporting evidence in favor of Income 
smoothing for both conventional banks and Islamic banks. Besides, we find supporting evidence 
of signaling argument for the Islamic banks. 
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In our hypothesis, we argue that bank managers in Islamic banks may be subjected to 
monitoring by the additional layer of governance structure, the Sharia’h board and accordingly, 
Islamic banks may exhibit less evidence for earnings management. However, we find contrary 
evidence as the earning management behaviors are not much different between Islamic and 
conventional banks. One may argue that such findings can be consistent with the prevailing 
common regulatory and frameworks in different jurisdiction as few countries provide separate 
legal and regulatory environment for the Islamic banks only. 
We find strong supporting evidence in favor of Income smoothing and capital 
management explanations for banks using IFRS accounting standards as EBTP coefficients are 
positive and significant and TIREONEREGCAP coefficients are negative and significant for the 
majority of the specifications. However, for the local GAAP practicing banks, there are weak 
evidence in favor of income smoothing and capital management arguments. Results are generally 
supportive of our arguments and suggest that banks using IFRS may exhibit significant evidence 
of earnings management. 
The impact of bank listing on earning management behavior for the given OIC member 
country sample is rather ambiguous. While extant literature suggests publicly traded and listed 
banks exhibiting more signs of earnings management compared to non-listed banks, instead we 
find conflicting empirical evidence. We find strong supporting evidence in favor of Income 
smoothing for both the listed and non-listed banks as EBTP coefficients are positive and 
significant. For the other two explanations, we find no significant evidence as change in EBTP is 
other negative and significant contrary to the signaling argument and TIREONEREGCAP 
coefficients are negative but significant for both types of banks. 
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Although we do not argue or provide any further analysis behind this conflicting result, 
we acknowledge that there is scope of further research on the impact of bank listing status on 
earning management behavior in OIC member countries. 
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Table 1 
Variable Description and Data source 
 
 Variable Name Variable Description Source Expected Signs 
1. Dependent Variable:   
 LLP Ratio of Loan Loss Provision over lag total assets Bank Scope  
2. Bank Characteristics variables   
 LLP (-1) & (-2) Lags of the dependent variable ” + ve 
 CRAR Required Tier I capital ” - ve for capital 
management 
 EBTP Earnings Before Tax and Profit normalized to lag 
total assets 
” + ve for 
income 
smoothing 
 ΔEBTP change in Earnings Before Tax and Provisioning 
normalized to total assets 
” + ve for 
signalling 
3. Bank Specialization Variable    
 ISLAMIC is dummy variable with 1 if a bank is Islamic and 
zero otherwise for a conventional bank 
 Opposite/ not 
significant 
 and Interaction of “ISLAMIC” Dummy with interest variables  
     
4. Accounting Standard Variable   
 IFRS is dummy variable with 1 if a bank uses a principle 
based or IFRS accounting standard, zero otherwise 
 Opposite/ not 
significant 
 and Interaction of PrincipleDummy with interest variables  
5. Bank Listing Status   
 LISTED is a dummy variable with 1 if a bank is listed and 
zero otherwise for a not-listed bank 
 Significant 
Country Specific Control Variables 
A. Macro Control variables   
 GDPGR real growth in per capita GDP IMF  
 GDP real GDP in billion dollar IMF  
 Inflation  IMF  
B. Regulatory control variables   
 DISCLOSURE accounting disclosure index La Porta et al. (1998)  
 RESTRICT measure of regulatory restrictions on bank activities Barth et al. (2001)  
 OFFICIAL measures the power of official bank supervision ”  
 MONITOR an index of private bank monitoring ”  
 STRUCT measures market-orientation of the financial system ”  
C. Legal control variables   
 LEGAL measure of legal enforcement La Porta et al. (1998)  
 ANTIDIRECTOR measure of protection of minority shareholders ”  
 CREDITOR measures creditor rights ”  
 LegalDummy a set of five dummies capturing five country legal 
origin, as alternate to LEGAL index 
”  
Other Fixed Effects   
 Country FE    
 Year FE    
 Bank FE    
     
     
La Porta et al. (1998) and Barth et al. (2001) provide points in time estimates of the variables that are generally 
constant over time. However, La Porta et al (2008) provides an update on La Porta et al (1998) indices. 
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Table 2 
Composition of Sample 
 
Panel A and B of Table 02 summarize the composition of the sample in terms of distribution of banks and 
bank years; a) by bank specialization and accounting standard; and b) by specialization and listing status. 
Conventional banks refer to commercial banks and bank holding companies as defined in BankScope 
database that are not otherwise Islamic banks. Listed banks refers to banks listed with major stock 
exchange and Not Listed banks include otherwise non-listed and delisted banks. Panel C presents 
distribution of bank years across sample period 2003 to 2010. Finally, Panel D summarizes the 
distribution of banks by specialization among the 35 OIC (Organization of Islamic Conference) countries.  
 
 
Panel A:  Sample composition by Bank Specialization and Accounting Standard 
Distribution of Banks 
 
Distribution of Bank Years 
 
Accounting Standard 
  
Accounting Standard 
Specialization IFRS Others Total 
 
Specialization IFRS Others Total 
Conventional Banks 116 129 245 
 
Conventional Banks 847 942 1789 
 
(39.86%) (44.33%) (84.19%) 
  
(40.76%) (45.33%) (86.09%) 
Islamic Banks 21 25 46 
 
Islamic Banks 140 149 289 
 
(7.22%) (8.59%) (15.81%) 
  
(6.74%) (7.17%) (13.91%) 
Total 137 154 291 
 
Total 987 1091 2078 
  (47.08%) (52.92%) (100%) 
 
  (47.5%) (52.5%) (100%) 
         Panel B: Sample composition by Bank Specialization and Listing Status 
 
Distribution of Banks 
 
Distribution of Bank Years 
 
Listing Status 
  
Listing Status 
Specialization Listed Not Listed Total 
 
Specialization Listed Not Listed Total 
Conventional Banks 144 101 245 
 
Conventional Banks 1062 727 1789 
 
(49.48%) (34.71%) (84.19%) 
  
(51.11%) (34.99%) (86.09%) 
Islamic Banks 21 25 46 
 
Islamic Banks 145 144 289 
 
(7.22%) (8.59%) (15.81%) 
  
(6.98%) (6.93%) (13.91%) 
Total 165 126 291 
 
Total 1207 871 2078 
  (56.7%) (43.3%) (100%) 
 
  (58.08%) (41.92%) (100%) 
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Table 2 
Composition of Sample (Continued.) 
 
Panel C: Distribution of Bank Years by Year 
Sl. Year No. of Banks % of Total Bank Years 
1 2003 200 9.62 % 
2 2004 212 10.20 % 
3 2005 243 11.69 % 
4 2006 275 13.23 % 
5 2007 291 14.00 % 
6 2008 289 13.91 % 
7 2009 290 13.96 % 
8 2010 278 13.38 % 
  Total 2078 100.00 % 
 
Panel D: Bank Specialization by Countries 
Sl. Country Name 
Conventional 
Banks 
Islamic 
Banks Total 
 
Sl. Country Name 
Conventional 
Banks 
Islamic 
Banks Total 
1 Afghanistan 1 0 1 
 
19 Mozambique 2 0 2 
2 Algeria 1 0 1 
 
20 Niger 1 0 1 
3 Azerbaijan 13 0 13 
 
21 Nigeria 6 0 6 
4 Bahrain 8 7 15 
 
22 Oman 6 0 6 
5 Bangladesh 17 1 18 
 
23 Pakistan 21 5 26 
6 Benin 1 0 1 
 
24 Qatar 5 3 8 
7 Bosnia-Herz 2 0 2 
 
25 Saudi Arabia 9 2 11 
8 Egypt 1 0 1 
 
26 Sierra LEON 1 0 1 
9 Guyana 1 0 1 
 
27 Suriname 1 0 1 
10 Indonesia 30 0 30 
 
28 Syria 4 1 5 
11 Iran 0 1 1 
 
29 Tajikistan 1 0 1 
12 Jordan 10 3 13 
 
30 Togo 1 0 1 
13 Kazakhstan 14 0 14 
 
31 Turkey 17 3 20 
14 Kuwait 5 3 8 
 
32 Uganda 12 0 12 
15 Lebanon 7 0 7 
 
33 United Arab Emirates 13 5 18 
16 Malaysia 23 11 34 
 
34 Uzbekistan 5 0 5 
17 Maldives 1 0 1 
 
35 Yemen 2 1 3 
18 Morocco 3 0 3 
 
          
              Total 245 46 291 
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Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A of Table 03 reports the descriptive statistics for the overall bank sample for the period of 2003 to 
2010. LLPtoAvgAss is the Loan Loss Provisioning normalized to Total Asset size, 
EBTPtoTotAsstRatio refers to Earnings before Tax and Provision normalized to Total Asset. Tier1 
RegCapRatio and TotRegCapRatioa are Tire I Regulatory capital and Total Regulatory Capital 
respectively, both normalized to Risk Weighted Asset. TotAsstMillUSD is the Total Asset Size in 
Million USD. ROA is Return of Average Asset and ROAE is Return on Average Equity. 
Later, Panel B, C and D present descriptive statistics for a) Islamic versus Conventional Banks, b) Listed 
versus Not-Listed Banks, and c) Banks using IFRS Accounting standards versus Banks using Local 
GAAP, and Welch t-statistics of the difference in mean at the rightmost column. (***), (**) and (*) refer 
to 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance based on two-tailed test statistics. 
Panel A: Overall Sample 
 
Mean Std. Dev. Median No. Bank Year 
LLPtoAvgAss 80.29 145.39 48.53 2078 
EBTPtoTotAsstRatio 2.90 2.76 2.67 2078 
Tier1 RegCapRatio 18.18 17.80 14.40 2078 
TotRegCapRatio 20.74 17.91 16.52 2078 
TotAsstMillUSD 7557.52 13337.20 1894.11 2078 
ROAA 1.56 4.37 1.58 2078 
ROAE 14.17 34.13 14.76 2078 
 
Panel B: Islamic Bank vs. Conventional Bank 
 
Islamic Banks 
 
Conventional Banks 
  
 
Mean Std. Dev. Median 
No. Bank 
Year 
 
Mean Std. Dev. Median 
No. Bank 
Year 
Welch 
t-stat 
 LLPtoA vgAss 57.61 92.97 48.08 289 
 
79.71 149.84 48.83 1789 -3.82 
 EBTPtoTotAsstRatio 2.64 4.72 2.46 289 
 
2.77 2.34 2.71 1789 -0.45 
 Tier1RegCapRatio 21.57 30.26 17.29 289 
 
14.64 14.79 14.06 1789 3.82 
 TotRegCapRatio 22.64 29.87 18.00 289 
 
18.03 15.53 16.28 1789 2.55 
 TotAsstMillUSD 4836.01 7991.80 2094.70 289 
 
7997.16 13964.88 1836.95 1789 -6.24 
 ROAA 1.49 7.01 1.50 289 
 
1.56 3.78 1.58 1789 -0.17 
 ROAE 14.58 56.51 11.29 289 
 
14.04 28.97 15.07 1789 0.16 
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Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics (Continued.) 
Panel C: Listed Banks vs. Not Listed Banks 
 
Listed Banks 
 
Not Listed Banks 
  
 
Mean Std. Dev. Median 
No. Bank 
Year 
 
Mean Std. Dev. Median 
No. Bank 
Year 
Welch 
t-stat 
 LLPtoAvgAsst 68.88 109.07 45.92 1207 
 
87.53 179.42 52.63 871 -4.32 
 EBTPtoTotAsstRatio 2.72 2.19 2.76 1207 
 
2.79 3.40 2.46 871 -0.61 
 Tier1 RegCapRatio 13.51 10.52 13.66 1207 
 
18.50 24.04 15.82 871 -7.17 
 TotRegCapRatio 16.34 10.73 15.84 1207 
 
21.91 24.59 17.96 871 -6.93 
 TotAsstMillUSD 9986.57 15221.64 3493.62 1207 
 
4191.43 9173.77 777.97 871 12.58 
 ROAA 1.65 3.50 1.67 1207 
 
1.42 5.34 1.41 871 1.97 
 ROAE 14.98 20.49 16.05 1207 
 
12.90 46.77 12.50 871 2.83 
 
 
 
Panel D: Banks with IFRS standard vs. Other standards 
 
 
Banks with IFRS Standard 
 
Banks with Other Standards 
  
 
Mean Std. Dev. Median 
No. Bank 
Year 
 
Mean Std. Dev. Median 
No. Bank 
Year 
Welch 
t-stat 
 LLPtoAvgAss 82.65 155.21 46.04 987 
 
71.31 131.02 51.01 1091 2.10 
 EBTPtoTotAsstRatio 3.04 3.04 2.87 987 
 
2.49 2.45 2.44 1091 4.47 
 Tier1 RegCapRatio 16.54 16.49 15.48 987 
 
14.75 18.65 12.80 1091 2.60 
 TotRegCapRatio 19.40 16.79 17.66 987 
 
18.02 19.20 15.43 1091 1.79 
 TotAsstMillUSD 8079.94 12575.96 2461.50 987 
 
7084.91 13985.01 1461.78 1091 2.19 
 ROAA 1.97 4.92 1.92 987 
 
1.18 3.76 1.34 1091 4.92 
 ROAE 12.80 32.32 14.54 987 
 
15.30 35.57 14.97 1091 -2.22 
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Table 4 
Descriptive Statistics of Country Control Variables 
Panel A of Table 04 reports the descriptive statistics for the country control variables for the OIC member 
countries for the period of 2003 to 2010. We use three macro-economic control variables; a) Per Capita 
GDP, b) GDP Growth and c) Inflation. However, we also present the descriptive statistics of GDP. Per 
Capita GDP is in Dollar value, while GDP values are in Billion Dollar in current price. GDP Growth and 
Inflation are in percentile. Besides that we also use corruption index collected from LLSV website as a 
control for governance. Panel A of Table 04 reports the descriptive statistics for overall sample. Panel B, 
C, D and E respectively reports the descriptive statistics for GDP in current price, Per Capita GDP, Per 
Capita GDP Growth, and Inflation. 
 
 
Panel A: Overall  
 
GDP Per Cap GDP Per Cap GDP Gr Inflation corrupt 
Max 730.318 76,435.367 57.027 26.757 0.847 
Min 0.985 208.204 -35.258 -12.241 -1.277 
Mean 92.388 7,218.688 12.150 7.046 -0.348 
Std. Dev. 136.078 12,849.586 12.223 5.352 0.572 
N 269 269 269 269 269 
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Table 4 
Descriptive Statistics of Country Control Variables 
Panel B: GDP in Current Price in Million Dollar 
 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Max 303.262 392.206 482.685 529.187 649.125 730.318 614.466 729.051 
Min 0.985 1.066 1.214 1.423 1.054 1.260 1.307 1.433 
Mean 55.454 64.515 72.535 85.679 98.749 119.197 108.212 125.545 
Std. Dev. 76.532 91.239 106.573 122.087 144.148 167.550 149.843 179.725 
N 30 31 34 34 35 35 35 35 
         Panel C: Per Capita GDP 
 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Max 32787.508 41626.129 48443.916 58072.986 65853.896 76435.367 59989.820 74422.604 
Min 208.204 216.340 237.636 270.012 306.960 351.066 325.663 324.996 
Mean 4817.415 5513.209 6021.512 7093.547 7902.212 9482.648 7684.804 8658.423 
Std. Dev. 7884.419 9395.085 10764.023 12914.131 14242.727 16745.354 12937.509 15109.397 
N 30 31 34 34 35 35 35 35 
         Panel D: Per Capita GDP Growth 
 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Max 28.514 38.736 50.887 57.027 55.670 40.832 19.695 27.210 
Min -8.792 -5.008 0.326 2.184 5.376 9.674 -35.258 -5.003 
Mean 11.859 14.563 14.796 15.375 16.675 21.040 -6.022 9.318 
Std. Dev. 8.416 8.357 9.736 10.610 9.001 7.416 13.372 8.130 
N 30 31 34 34 35 35 35 35 
         Panel E: Inflation 
 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Max 25.338 16.693 17.114 15.313 22.500 26.757 13.139 16.514 
Min -1.497 0.282 0.517 0.362 0.942 4.229 -12.241 0.450 
Mean 6.243 5.962 6.928 7.105 8.196 11.880 3.890 5.920 
Std. Dev. 7.228 4.456 3.911 3.523 5.049 5.689 5.089 3.797 
N 30 31 34 34 35 35 35 35 
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Table 5 
Pearson Correlation Analysis 
Table 05 presents the Pearson correlation matrix for the major explanatory variables; a) Loan Loss 
Provisioning normalized to Total Asset (LLP), b) Earnings before Tax and Provision normalized to Total 
Asset (EBTPtoTOTAssetRatio), c) Tire I Regulatory Capital normalized to Risk-weighted asset 
(TIREONEREGCAP), d) Total Regulatory Capital normalized to Risked-weighted asset 
(TOTREGCAPRATIO), and e) Total Asset of Banks (TOTASSTTHOUUSD) as Bank specific control 
variable. Correlation between the pairs of variables are reported along with their probability i.e. p-values 
within the parenthesis. 
Probability LLP EBTPtoTOTAssetRatio TIREONEREGCAP TOTREGCAPRATIO TOTASSTTHOUUSD 
LLP  1 
      ----- 
      
     EBTPtoTOTAssetRatio 0.0789 1 
     (0.0013) ----- 
     
     TIREONEREGCAP  -0.1402 0.0800 1 
    (0.0000) (0.0011) ----- 
    
     TOTREGCAPRATIO  -0.1193 0.0971 0.978841 1 
   (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) ----- 
   
     TOTASSTTHOUUSD  -0.0835 -0.0454 -0.13048 -0.12124 1 
  (0.0007) (0.0641) (0.0000) (0.0000) ----- 
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Table 6 
Panel Regression on LLP for Overall OIC Sample 
 
Table 06 reports Panel Regression results on LLP for the following model for the overall sample: 
                                                                     (1) 
                                                                  
where, LLP is Loan Loss Provisioning normalized to Total Asset, EBTP is Earnings before Tax and 
Provision normalized to Total Asset and TIREONEREGCAP is Tire I Regulatory Capital normalized to 
Risk-weighted asset. CHANGEEBTP is percentage change in EBTP. TOTASST is Total Asset of the 
sample Banks (in thousand dollars) used as Bank specific control variable. PERCAPGDP, 
PERCAPITAGDPGROWTH and INFLATION are the per capita GDP (Gross Domestic Product) in 
US Dollar of the country under the sample, their growth in per capita GDP (in percentage) and Inflation 
rate (in percentage), used as country control variables. 
Sample period is 2003 to 2010 with 291 Banks and number of Bank Years. Colum (1) reports Pooled 
OLS regression with no period or cross-section fixed effects. All estimates are based on Arellano and 
Bond (1991) dynamic panel GMM procedure with the White-corrected diagonal errors.  In column (1) 
and (4) estimations all three country control variables are included. However, in (2) and (5) percapgdp 
and inflation are included and in (3) and (6) percapgdp and inflation are included. For each variable, first 
row represent the coefficient estimate and the latter value in parenthesis represents the p-value.  
 
  (1)   (2)   (3) 
  Coefficient   Coefficient   Coefficient 
LLP(-1) 0.128 
 
0.085 
 
0.114 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.000) 
      
EBTP 0.632 
 
0.969 
 
3.708 
 
(0.924) 
 
(0.867) 
 
(0.459) 
      
CHANGEEBTP -1.430 
 
-1.376 
 
-1.405 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
      
TIREONEREGCAP -0.822 
 
-0.850 
 
-0.803 
 
(0.139) 
 
(0.142) 
 
(0.137) 
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Table 6 
Panel Regression on LLP for Overall OIC Sample (Continued.) 
 
  (1)   (2)   (3) 
  Coefficient   Coefficient   Coefficient 
Bank and country controls    
LOG(TOTASST) 8.813 
 
19.984 
 
11.747 
 
(0.321) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.084) 
      
PERCAPGDP -0.002 
 
-0.003 
 
-0.002 
 
(0.045) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.027) 
      
PERCAPITAGDPGROWTH -0.841 
 
- 
 
-0.719 
 
(0.006) 
 
- 
 
(0.003) 
      
INFLATION 0.911 
 
-0.253 
 
- 
 
(0.396) 
 
(0.773) 
 
- 
Year dummies    
Year 2005 dummy 7.541 
 
15.547 
 
8.130 
 
(0.393) 
 
(0.060) 
 
(0.349) 
      
Year 2006 dummy 9.213 
 
12.155 
 
10.595 
 
(0.261) 
 
(0.127) 
 
(0.183) 
      
Year 2007 dummy 21.940 
 
20.410 
 
21.842 
 
(0.033) 
 
(0.043) 
 
(0.029) 
      
Year 2008 dummy 4.811 
 
0.908 
 
3.620 
 
(0.669) 
 
(0.934) 
 
(0.736) 
      
Year 2009 dummy -2.110 
 
6.618 
 
0.653 
 
(0.839) 
 
(0.520) 
 
(0.950) 
      
Year 2010 dummy -5.145 
 
-1.190 
 
-2.741 
  (0.662)   (0.919)   (0.816) 
Effects Specification 
     Cross-section fixed (first differences) in each equation 
Period fixed (dummy variables) in each equation 
S.E. of regression 169.028 
 
165.205 
 
166.773 
J-statistic 23.547   29.891   24.142 
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Table 7 
Panel Regression on LLP: Islamic versus Conventional Banks 
 
Table 07 reports Panel Regression results on LLP for the following model for two sub-sample: one 
sample comprising conventional banks only and other sample comprising Islamic banks only: 
                                                                     (1) 
                                                                  
where, LLP is Loan Loss Provisioning normalized to Total Asset, EBTP is Earnings before Tax and 
Provision normalized to Total Asset and TIREONEREGCAP is Tire I Regulatory Capital normalized to 
Risk-weighted asset. CHANGEEBTP is percentage change in EBTP. TOTASST is Total Asset of the 
sample Banks (in thousand dollars) used as Bank specific control variable. PERCAPGDP, 
PERCAPITAGDPGROWTH and INFLATION are the per capita GDP (Gross Domestic Product) in 
US Dollar of the country under the sample, their growth in per capita GDP (in percentage) and Inflation 
rate (in percentage), used as country control variables. 
All estimates are based on Arellano and Bond (1991) dynamic panel GMM procedure with the White-
corrected diagonal errors.  For each variable, first row represent the coefficient estimate and the latter 
value in parenthesis represents the p-value. 
 
  Convent.   
 
  Islamic   
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) (6) 
  Co-eff. Co-eff. Co-eff.   Co-eff. Co-eff. Co-eff. 
LLP(-1) -0.143 -0.139 -0.138 
 
0.191 0.197 0.194 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
        
EBTP 7.743 13.869 9.844 
 
3.110 2.634 3.142 
 
(0.129) (0.004) (0.026) 
 
(0.007) (0.019) (0.012) 
        
CHANGEEBTP -1.513 -1.453 -1.473 
 
9.612 7.599 9.867 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
        
TIREONEREGCAP -0.444 -0.515 -0.527 
 
0.217 0.245 0.222 
 
(0.413) (0.326) (0.314) 
 
(0.023) (0.025) (0.018) 
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Table 7 
Panel Regression on LLP: Islamic versus Conventional Banks (Continued.) 
 
  Convent.   
 
  Islamic   
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) (6) 
  Co-eff. Co-eff. Co-eff.   Co-eff. Co-eff. Co-eff. 
Bank and country controls     
LOG(TOTASST) 5.601 5.762 5.675 
 
4.201 4.310 4.060 
 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
        
PERCAPGDP -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 
(0.164) (0.019) (0.160) 
 
(0.002) (0.000) (0.002) 
        
PERCAPITAGDPGROWTH -1.085 - -1.014 
 
-0.828 - -0.878 
 
(0.000) - (0.000) 
 
(0.000) - (0.000) 
        
INFLATION 0.780 -0.882 - 
 
-0.350 -1.580 - 
 
(0.322) (0.163) - 
 
(0.058) (0.000) - 
Year Dummies        
Year 2005 dummy -8.479 -5.385 -8.653 
 
0.024 0.382 -0.027 
 
(0.116) (0.339) (0.112) 
 
(0.968) (0.498) (0.965) 
        
Year 2006 dummy 0.583 0.173 1.447 
 
0.553 0.421 0.585 
 
(0.914) (0.975) (0.787) 
 
(0.180) (0.196) (0.168) 
        
Year 2007 dummy 5.444 8.499 4.307 
 
0.657 0.452 0.653 
 
(0.339) (0.152) (0.445) 
 
(0.305) (0.412) (0.307) 
        
Year 2008 dummy -1.717 -2.846 -2.017 
 
0.068 0.476 0.103 
 
(0.779) (0.650) (0.741) 
 
(0.924) (0.512) (0.892) 
        
Year 2009 dummy -0.267 8.687 2.196 
 
-0.250 0.006 -0.272 
 
(0.965) (0.112) (0.684) 
 
(0.689) (0.992) (0.718) 
        
Year 2010 dummy 11.048 7.508 10.998 
 
-0.161 0.028 -0.221 
  (0.014) (0.114) (0.015)   (0.480) (0.880) (0.361) 
Effects Specification 
       Cross-section fixed (first differences) 
      Period fixed (dummy variables)             
S.E. of regression 150.045 149.859 149.651 
 
25.806 25.945 25.831 
J-statistic 38.393 52.945 39.726   29.777 31.547 29.664 
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Table 8 
Panel Regression on LLP: IFRS Accounting Standard vs. Local GAAP 
 
Table 08 reports Panel Regression results on LLP for the following model for two sub-sample: one 
sample comprising local GAAP banks only and other sample comprising IFRS banks only: 
                                                                     (1) 
                                                                  
where, LLP is Loan Loss Provisioning normalized to Total Asset, EBTP is Earnings before Tax and 
Provision normalized to Total Asset and TIREONEREGCAP is Tire I Regulatory Capital normalized to 
Risk-weighted asset. CHANGEEBTP is percentage change in EBTP. TOTASST is Total Asset of the 
sample Banks (in thousand dollars) used as Bank specific control variable. PERCAPGDP, 
PERCAPITAGDPGROWTH and INFLATION are the per capita GDP (Gross Domestic Product) in 
US Dollar of the country under the sample, their growth in per capita GDP (in percentage) and Inflation 
rate (in percentage), used as country control variables. 
All estimates are based on Arellano and Bond (1991) dynamic panel GMM procedure with the White-
corrected diagonal errors.  For each variable, first row represent the coefficient estimate and the latter 
value in parenthesis represents the p-value. 
 
  GAP       IFRS   
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) (6) 
  Co-eff. Co-eff. Co-eff.   Co-eff. Co-eff. Co-eff. 
LLP(-1) -0.163 -0.156 -0.159 
 
-0.075 -0.087 -0.091 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
        
EBTP 8.403 7.072 9.318 
 
5.949 6.464 7.131 
 
(0.059) (0.088) (0.039) 
 
(0.036) (0.024) (0.014) 
        
CHANGEEBTP -1.411 -1.349 -1.376 
 
3.738 1.244 2.155 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.086) (0.468) (0.254) 
        
TIREONEREGCAP -0.948 -1.253 -0.904 
 
-0.506 -0.247 -0.378 
 
(0.055) (0.013) (0.065) 
 
(0.406) (0.635) (0.491) 
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Table 8 
Panel Regression on LLP: IFRS Accounting Standard vs. Local GAAP (Continued.) 
 
    GAP       IFRS   
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) (6) 
  Co-eff. Co-eff. Co-eff.   Co-eff. Co-eff. Co-eff. 
Firm Control and Country Control Variables    
LOG(TOTASST) 4.947 5.883 4.463 
 
4.016 4.695 4.475 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
      
PERCAPGDP -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 
0.000 -0.001 0.000 
 
(0.005) (0.000) (0.004) 
 
(0.979) (0.001) (0.895) 
      
PERCAPITAGDPGROWTH -0.521 
 
-0.602 
 
-1.379 
 
-1.246 
 
(0.052) 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
    
INFLATION -0.851 -1.489 
  
1.585 -0.572 
 
 
(0.473) (0.029) 
  
(0.030) (0.364) 
 Year Dummies        
Year 2005 dummy -0.183 2.055 -1.502 
 
0.593 -1.312 -1.925 
 
(0.955) (0.497) (0.608) 
 
(0.878) (0.729) (0.592) 
      
Year 2006 dummy -4.037 -3.918 -3.833 
 
1.468 3.403 3.037 
 
(0.212) (0.222) (0.233) 
 
(0.622) (0.214) (0.315) 
      
Year 2007 dummy 5.697 4.505 5.775 
 
4.356 2.461 2.393 
 
(0.126) (0.205) (0.109) 
 
(0.180) (0.465) (0.436) 
      
Year 2008 dummy 7.750 7.688 7.436 
 
-1.318 -1.264 0.339 
 
(0.102) (0.082) (0.097) 
 
(0.634) (0.625) (0.897) 
      
Year 2009 dummy -2.658 1.013 -1.452 
 
-3.956 2.368 -2.330 
 
(0.457) (0.767) (0.685) 
 
(0.307) (0.510) (0.513) 
      
Year 2010 dummy 2.281 -1.415 2.672 
 
5.387 1.025 4.264 
 
(0.434) (0.571) (0.287) 
 
(0.108) (0.748) (0.187) 
Effects Specification 
       Cross-section fixed (first differences) 
    Period fixed (dummy variables) 
     S.E. of regression 119.750 119.442 120.033 
 
94.324 95.975 94.101 
J-statistic 35.791 45.099 32.545   37.304 45.931 40.285 
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Table 9 
Panel Regression on LLP: Listed versus Non-Listed Banks 
Table 09 reports Panel Regression results on LLP for the following model for two sub-sample: one 
sample comprising conventional banks only and other sample comprising Islamic banks only: 
                                                                     (1) 
                                                                  
where, LLP is Loan Loss Provisioning normalized to Total Asset, EBTP is Earnings before Tax and 
Provision normalized to Total Asset and TIREONEREGCAP is Tire I Regulatory Capital normalized to 
Risk-weighted asset. CHANGEEBTP is percentage change in EBTP. TOTASST is Total Asset of the 
sample Banks (in thousand dollars) used as Bank specific control variable. PERCAPGDP, 
PERCAPITAGDPGROWTH and INFLATION are the per capita GDP (Gross Domestic Product) in 
US Dollar of the country under the sample, their growth in per capita GDP (in percentage) and Inflation 
rate (in percentage), used as country control variables. 
All estimates are based on Arellano and Bond (1991) dynamic panel GMM procedure with the White-
corrected diagonal errors.  For each variable, first row represent the coefficient estimate and the latter 
value in parenthesis represents the p-value. 
 
  Listed   
 
  Nonlisted   
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) (6) 
  Co-eff. Co-eff. Co-eff.   Co-eff. Co-eff. Co-eff. 
LLP(-1) -0.097 -0.100 -0.088 
 
-0.162 -0.164 -0.159 
 
(0.008) (0.005) (0.014) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
        
EBTP 5.793 5.834 5.083 
 
12.983 13.417 12.984 
 
(0.036) (0.037) (0.064) 
 
(0.013) (0.007) (0.007) 
        
CHANGEEBTP -10.475 -9.505 -10.338 
 
-1.370 -1.364 -1.351 
 
(0.032) (0.047) (0.031) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
        
TIREONEREGCAP -0.681 -0.418 -0.763 
 
-0.320 -0.312 -0.400 
  (0.442) (0.578) (0.414)   (0.383) (0.381) (0.249) 
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Table 9 
Panel Regression on LLP: Listed versus Non-Listed Banks (Continued) 
 
  Listed   
 
  Nonlisted   
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) (6) 
  Co-eff. Co-eff. Co-eff.   Co-eff. Co-eff. Co-eff. 
Firm Control and Country Control Variables 
LOG(TOTASST) 5.577 5.798 5.521 
 
4.224 3.909 3.959 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.016) (0.022) (0.023) 
        
PERCAPGDP -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 
-0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 
(0.148) (0.003) (0.151) 
 
(0.077) (0.077) (0.104) 
        
PERCAPITAGDPGROWTH -0.878 - -0.959 
 
-0.760 - -0.790 
 
(0.000) - (0.000) 
 
(0.001) - (0.000) 
        
INFLATION -0.746 -1.892 - 
 
-0.165 -1.140 - 
  (0.186) (0.000) -   (0.838) (0.115) - 
Year Dummies        
Year 2005 dummy  -4.294 -3.844 -3.872 
 
0.334 0.375 -0.299 
 
(0.177) (0.243) (0.213) 
 
(0.909) (0.898) (0.916) 
        
Year 2006 dummy  3.555 1.936 3.524 
 
2.383 2.356 1.367 
 
(0.252) (0.525) (0.253) 
 
(0.457) (0.449) (0.668) 
        
Year 2007 dummy  3.979 5.436 4.222 
 
8.432 8.244 7.406 
 
(0.209) (0.091) (0.183) 
 
(0.030) (0.033) (0.043) 
        
Year 2008 dummy  -0.024 0.864 -0.135 
 
-1.939 -1.773 -1.958 
 
(0.995) (0.818) (0.970) 
 
(0.607) (0.638) (0.596) 
        
Year 2009 dummy  -3.606 -1.466 -4.190 
 
2.235 3.144 3.053 
 
(0.309) (0.684) (0.227) 
 
(0.497) (0.339) (0.332) 
        
Year 2010 dummy  4.611 1.475 4.492 
 
-0.345 -1.146 0.081 
  (0.139) (0.634) (0.150)   (0.891) (0.644) (0.974) 
Effects Specification 
       Cross-section fixed (first differences) 
       Period fixed (dummy variables)               
S.E. of regression 82.985 83.504 83.060 
 
124.956 124.767 125.027 
J-statistic 56.328 59.727 57.223   39.943 44.415 38.938 
 
